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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the perception of the EU as a rules promoter for energy regulatory agencies in 
four southern Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Egypt, Turkey and Jordan. The restructuring of the 
energy sector, as promoted by the EU in the southern Mediterranean region, is considered to be the 
main criteria to evaluate the EU’s modes of external governance. The EU’s modes of governance are 
comparatively assessed through a perception survey. The case studies have been selected due to their 
relevance in terms of energy sector restructuring and energy exchanges. Among the modes of 
governance considered, the top-down approach appears to be the most promising mode for rules 
diffusion.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The southern Mediterranean region is currently at the centre of renewed interests in energy (electricity, gas and 
renewables). Southern Mediterranean countries have considerable resources from renewable generation for both self-
sufficiency and energy trading (MedReg 2012). Energy consumption in the southern Mediterranean is expected to increase 
over the next 20 years by 70%, with an 87% reliance on fossil fuels (European Commission 2007b). In 2009, the primary 
energy consumption reached a level of 311 Mtoe2, of which 44% was covered by oil, 36% by natural gas, 14% by coal 
(primarily in Turkey and Morocco) and 6% by renewables (Hafner, Tagliapietra, El Andaloussi 2012). In the near future, 
the energy demand is expected to increase by 2% per year to reach 1.405 Mtoe (OME 2011). In the OME scenario, the 
southern Mediterranean countries account for “33% of the region’s energy demand today” (OME 2011), which may 
expand to 47% by 2030.  
The aforementioned data confirm the relevance of projects in favour of energy sector restructuring such as those 
sponsored by the EU. Initiatives such as the Mediterranean Solar Plan, launched within the framework of the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM), stress the role that energy sector restructuring may have on improving generation capacity for both 
energy self-sufficiency and energy exchange between the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Euro-Mediterranean 
cooperation has allowed the advancement of small and very technical aspects of energy generation, further stressing the 
role of the functional integration approach (Werenfels and Westphal, 2010).  
The process of energy sector restructuring promoted by the EU builds on the EU’s experience as a regulatory actor. In 
this regard, this paper investigates the perception of the EU as a rules promoter in the energy field by the energy regulatory 
agencies of four Middle Eastern and Northern African (MENA) countries: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. Having in 
mind the specificities of the EU regulatory framework (i.e., the establishment of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), 
the tariff setting processes, the presence of a Third Party Access (TPA) regime, and unbundling), this study may also 
contribute to the assessment of the effectiveness of the EU as a rules promoter. 
In this regard, the establishment of an IRA is the main criteria according to which our sample has been defined. The 
MENA countries included in this study have all introduced an independent regulator for the energy sector. Israel is the sole 
country that has established an IRA but is not included in this study because the appropriate officials never responded to 
our enquiry. Moreover, all of the considered countries are related to the EU through partnership building programs and, in 
the Turkish case, by prospective membership. The sample includes relevant countries as energy producers and energy 
corridors for both EU–MENA relationships (i.e., Algeria and Turkey) and at the intra-MENA level (Egypt). These 
countries are representative of all regimes in the region (Presidential, Algeria and Egypt; Parliamentary, Turkey; 
Monarchy, Jordan) and are all at the centre of investment projects for renewable energy. Finally, these countries have 
consolidated relationships with the EU: for example, Turkey, a candidate country for EU membership since 1987, is 
gradually adopting and implementing the acquis communautaire on energy. Thus, Turkey is directly subject to EU direct 
pressure for rules adoption and implementation. With regards to Egypt and Jordan, both countries joined the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995. Currently, the two countries are taking part in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Association Agreements (AAs) between these countries and the 
EU entered into force in 2002 for Jordan and 2004 for Egypt. On the base of AAs, bilateral Action Plans (APs) identify the 
actions to be implemented as well as the financial resources required. In the case of Algeria, despite its participation in EU 
initiatives, a bilateral AP is still missing. 
The study emphasises the EU’s top-down pressure for rules adoption as well as the EU’s indirect, network-based, 
rules promotion. The case of network pressure is represented primarily by the Association of the Mediterranean Regulators 
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for electricity and gas (MedReg) which is financially supported by both the EU and the Associations’ members. At the 
same time, domestic, bottom-up pressure for rules change is also considered. 
The research method adopted consists of a perception survey directed at the MENA regulators for the four mentioned 
countries.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature on rules change, referring to the three sources 
of pressure for rules change as the explanatory factors for rules diffusion: the bottom-up, the top-down, and the network 
approach to rules diffusion and promotion. In Section 3, we undertake a brief description of the three elements of energy 
sector regulation, on which our study focuses, to verify the coherence between the EU domestic model of regulation and 
the model promoted in the southern neighbourhood. Section 4 presents the methodology of the survey, while Section 5 
reports the primary results from our case studies. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.  
 
2. Explanatory factors for energy rules diffusion  
 
Introducing liberalisation in monopoly sectors through restructuring (unbundling), competition (wholesale market), and 
regulation (TPA regime and establishing IRAs) is a common feature of the regulatory state (Majone 1997). These are the 
results of the globalisation of regulation (Levi-Faur 2005): the worldwide spread of rules and principles on energy sector 
management.  
The starting point of this analysis is that the EU is trying to establish a shared regulatory framework for the energy 
sector that replicates in the neighbouring countries the model of “domestic” regulation as it has been defined since the 
mid-1990s and its evolution until the Third Package adopted in 2009. The EU promotes itself as a regulatory power 
beyond its own borders (Schimmelfennig 2009) and thereby tries to overcome the limits of the external energy policy.  
The external energy policy is questioned by scholars because of the Member States’ divergent interests and the 
persistence of national sovereignty in energy supply decisions (Andoura and Végh 2009). First, the external energy policy 
is defined as one policy that lacks effectiveness considering the constitutional limits of EU foreign actions and 
competences on energy, as well as the consequent missing EU bargaining power at the international level (Checchi, 
Behrens, Egenhofer, 2009). Second, the difficulty of integrating the security of supply, market liberalisation, and 
environmental issues further limits the external projection of the EU energy policy. However, despite these critical aspects, 
the EU focuses more on the external dimensions of energy today, especially as a domestic energy market is defined. 
The current framework of cooperation, the UfM, may favour overcoming such limits by focusing on functional 
integration at the level of sectorial issues of cooperation. While, on the one hand, there are also some doubts as to the 
impact of the sectorial governance on the good governance of the partner countries, on the other hand, this framework 
proposes a time-specific political context that allows specific projects to be worked on, such as solar energy, as the only 
feasible approach to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation (Bicchi 2011).  
In addition to the rules promoted by the EU through its direct involvement (top-down rules promotion), approaches 
that are directed at favouring MENA involvement in the definition of the Euro-Mediterranean shared regulatory 
framework on energy should be recommended—in particular, approaches that specifically consider common interests for 
managing the current and future deployment of renewable energies. To achieve a Euro-Mediterranean shared regulatory 
framework, MENA domestic institutional variables need to be considered.  
To be effective, rules promoted by international actors should be adopted and implemented in the countries’ domestic 
system. Rules change is possible when there is some degree of incompatibility between the rule promoter’s model of 
regulation – the EU energy acquis – and the domestic model that pushes for adaptation. Second, the actors should favour 
rules change (Börzel and Risse 2003). Thus, in addition to the presence of a top-down pressure for rules adoption, 
domestic pressures for rules change should be taken into account. Under this rationale, the institutional background (North, 
  
1990; Levy and Spiller, 1994) of selected countries reveals the reasons why the promoted rules may be adopted and 
implemented with different degrees of effectiveness.  
Analysing the elements of the acquis communautaire on energy promoted in the Mediterranean region is beneficial 
for explaining what Radaelli (2005) defines as the phenomena of “diffusion without convergence”. Moreover, with regards 
to regulation and regulatory impact assessment, recent studies confirm the importance of domestic political variables (Peci 
and Sobral 2011) as well as “the role of policymakers’ ideological legacies in explaining variation in rules adoption” 
(Gallardo and Murillo 2011). The institutional environment, indeed, can create a truly effective process for rules 
convergence among countries engaged in the same frameworks of cooperation. 
The following paragraphs illustrate the main hypotheses associated with the three potential explanations for rules 
promotion and adoption, as derived from previous studies on EU external governance methods and from the institutional 
economics literature. The first paragraph considers EU hierarchical – top-down – pressure. The hierarchy mode of rules 
promotion refers to the EU’s rules promotion within the Euro-Mediterranean frameworks of cooperation, which have been 
developing since the mid-1990s. The incentives mechanisms provided by the EU initiatives, thus, are considered to be 
particularly relevant. The second explanatory factor, network pressure for rules change, analyses the socialisation 
mechanisms within networking initiatives. By analysing the perception of MedReg, which is conceived within this work as 
a model of network governance sponsored by the EU, the EU’s indirect pressure for rules change is assessed. Third and 
finally, we consider the domestic – bottom-up – pressures for rules change. This type of pressure refers to the MENA’s 
voluntary adherence to the EU model for the organisation of the energy sector. This factor conceives of the countries’ 
executives as central actors in rules change.  
2.1 Hierarchy pressure  
The literature on EU external governance focuses on the external diffusion of the EU acquis, or part of it, due to the 
pressure applied by the EU in its immediate neighbourhood (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). The replication of the 
EU system in the neighbouring countries, as well as the achievement of a Euro-Mediterranean Energy Community, is the 
declared outcome of the promoted process of regional integration. Furthermore, this type of integration is expected to be 
differentiated (Lavenex, 2004) for the various countries due to their diverse relationships with the EU and their varying 
degrees of involvement in the EU initiatives. The direct pressure, also described by the literature on EU external 
governance as a hierarchy mode of governance, is very close to the cases of Europeanisation.  
As stressed by Radaelli (2003), Europeanisation is a pervasive process consisting of the diffusion and implementation 
of formal and informal rules and procedures emanating from the EU and incorporated into the domestic discourse and into 
public policies. In the case of the MENA countries, the diffusion of the EU rules occurs in the absence of membership 
linkages, and with the sole exception of Turkey, whose membership status is currently deadlocked, the countries 
considered in our analysis are only linked with the EU through partnership programmes. However, the current framework 
of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation may favour the spread of European rules through the implementation of incentive 
mechanisms.  
Incentives, included in the signed APs, primarily refer to conditionality measures. Linking the concession of funds and 
technical assistance to the adoption of political and economic reforms is how conditionality was supposed to work. 
However, the conditional concession of funds has never been invoked (Stahn and van Hüllen 2007), such as in the case of 
the Governance Facility funds. Established in 2005, funds were allocated only in 2008 for Morocco without verifying 
eventual improvements on democracy, respect for human rights, and rule of law (European Commission 2008). In the 
Egyptian case, the EU did not react to the increased authoritarianism of President Mubarak following the Constitutional 
reform of 2007 adopted on the basis of the 2005 electoral results. For the first time, the political affirmation of major 
promoters of political liberalisation, such as Al Ghad and Kifaya, was registered. Despite the political reactions to 
increased authoritarianism, the concession of funds under the ENP was not interrupted.  
  
As previous studies prove, conditionality works only if “the EU offers a membership perspective in return for 
political reform” (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008). Therefore, we may expect that the quest for rules change through 
hierarchy modes of governance is not as effective in the MENA case, while new forms of horizontal flexible integration 
through networks of governance may allow integration beyond conditionality (Lavenex 2008).  
 
2.2 Network pressure 
Usually recognised as being between the top-down and bottom-up methods, the indirect mode of rules diffusion refers 
to all those new modes of governance (Eberlein and Kerwer 2002) that are generally driven by “voluntarism and inclusion 
mechanisms” (Héritier 2002), such as networks.  
Network forms of cooperation are described as the most promising forms, specifically in those cases in which strong 
interdependencies between actors exist. Contrary to the top-down explanations, networking cooperation allows the MENA 
countries to act not as passive beneficiaries of particular promoted rules but, instead, as active participants in the rules 
definition.  
Thus, networks may facilitate the emergence of a shared regulatory framework by virtue of mediation processes 
among actors instead of through top-down diffusion or simple imitation. To ensure that indirect cooperation functions, it is 
necessary to put networks, shared frameworks of action and shared regulatory frameworks into place. In this manner, 
networks of governance are “made up of organisations which need to exchange resources to achieve their objectives” 
(Rhodes 1996). Shared processes for decision making usually characterise networks, which tend to develop their own 
“internal relational rationality” to manage complex situations (Ladeur 2004). Moreover, the literature on EU external 
governance views all actors within the networks as being formally equal, but it also recognises that power asymmetries 
may exist. The same literature affirms that networks do not produce binding rules but mutual agreements and often 
prescribe procedural modes of interaction rather than final policy solutions (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009).  
With special attention to networks, we focus on the case of MedReg. Created in 2006 as a form of cooperation among 
Mediterranean regulators, then supported by the EU, the association is registered as a non-profit association under Italian 
law, and its Secretariat is based in Milan. Although still dependent upon EU financial sources, MedReg is a membership-
based association3. The association demonstrates the characteristics identified by Rhodes (1996) for networks: voluntary 
cooperation and membership. The members are interdependent authorities, as even authorities of EU Member States are 
taking part. MedReg may be taken as a new case of the network governance of energy in the Mediterranean basin due to 
the defined coordination structure and the commitments of the participating countries. Contrary to experiences such as 
MEDELEC and OME (see Section 5, 5.3), MedReg shows an overall and long-term vision for energy development in the 
Mediterranean basin.   
To some extent, MedReg appears to be characterised by interdependent and continuously interacting (Rhodes 1996) 
members. Although dependent on the support of states, MedReg is self-governing, with a network secretariat, and is 
characterised by internal coordination procedures. There has been a recent attempt to achieve coordination, although it has 
been difficult to confirm that, for now, self-organising practices and the members’ co-definition of rules properly exist. On 
the contrary, we expect that the problems related to a young and very flexible structure of coordination may limit, to a 
certain extent, the effectiveness of MedReg’s actions and, consequently, the EU’s indirect pressure for rules change.  
 
2.3 Bottom-up pressure  
                                                 
3 MedReg includes Albania, Algeria, the Palestinian Authority, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus, Croatia, Egypt, France, Jordan, Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta, 
Morocco, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey 
  
Bottom-up pressure refers to the domestic pressure for rules change. When effectual, such pressure may favour the 
adoption of a system of rules that are consolidated and recognised to be effective at an international level. Consequently, 
bottom-up pressure facilitates rules convergence among the countries involved within the same framework of cooperation.  
Convergence, thus, depends on the countries’ voluntary approximation towards a defined system of rules (Barbé et al. 
2009). The justification behind convergence may be the need to ensure that the regulatory framework of a country is 
credible. For this reason, in this analysis, the countries in which an IRA has been established and information is available 
are considered first. Moreover, the existence of a TPA regime, network unbundling, and an incentive-based tariff system 
have been taken into consideration as indicators of the commitment towards energy sector liberalisation by the MENA 
incumbents.  
A persistent patronage system and state-owned assets raise doubts about the effectiveness of the agencies’ 
independence. Having established an IRA before implementing the sector’s liberalisation reforms, for example, in Algeria, 
Egypt and Turkey, may result in a sort of mimickery of the recommended regulatory standard; a behaviour that does not 
correspond to strong regulatory commitments. At the same time, we may expect that the pivotal actors deciding whether to 
adopt a specific system of rules represent the executive powers; this is due to the permanence in power of the executive 
parties and leaders during the 1990 – 2010 period, despite political elections (i.e., Algeria and Egypt) and the non-elected 
nature of the executive power (i.e., Jordan). Turkey, a Parliamentary Republic, is the sole country where an alternation of 
the parties in power may be observed; nonetheless, the executive’s veto power is stronger than the legislative and judiciary 
one (Freedom House - Turkey, 2011). 
Executives, thus, are the reference point of EU officials. Without their commitments, no rules change is possible; at 
the same time, stressing the role of executives and their economic branch further strengthens the consolidated systems of 
power such as those already verified for the EU member states (Börzel and Sprungk 2007) and the eastern neighbouring 
countries (Petersen 2012; Wolczuk 2009).  
To clarify the content of the promoted EU energy rules, the next section addresses the evolution of the EU regulatory 
experience in the energy sector. 
 
3. The EU model for sector organisation and the rationale behind it  
 
The EU liberalisation process was primarily a political decision based on the need to guarantee the freedom of 
enterprise (the production side of the market) and the freedom of choice (the consumer side) and to foster effective 
competition within the Union. The process of liberalisation and the further integration of the energy market implied the 
unbundling of networks and the independence of regulators from both the state and the energy industry. This process of 
progressive liberalisation can be described as three waves, which refer to the three directives reported in table 1. The table 
shows the parallel development of electricity and gas liberalisation. The table also shows how progressively the role of the 
regulators emerges and the unbundling transmission and distribution operators acquire relevance. The existing regulatory 
framework is the final result of these gradual changes. When a sector inquiry by the European Directorate on Competition 
(DG COMP) in 2005 showed that dominant positions were still at stake and that a further wave of liberalisation was 
required, the definition of a “third package” of directives was begun.  
The current package focuses on the independence of system operators; the strengthened role and independence of 
national regulators; the establishment of ENTSO - the European association of transmission and system operators for both 
electricity and gas; and the establishment of ACER - the agency for the cooperation of energy regulators. 
The principles of transparency and liberalisation, such as network unbundling, the TPA regime, and the IRA 
establishment, can also be identified in documents regarding Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. With regards to the 
southern neighbouring countries, the EU certainly tried to extend the internal energy market (IEM) principles through a 
  
policy mirroring domestic experience and following the strategy for Central Europe (Matláry 1995, p. 55). The first 
attempt to define an Energy Charter using the model of the Energy Charter Treaty was unsuccessful. Then, the project of 
regional framework of cooperation emerged, and the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Forum was launched in 1996.  
Although very little has been achieved during the second half of the 1990s in terms of EU rules adoption by 
Mediterranean countries, it should be stressed that energy remains one of the main pillars of the EU cooperation programs 
in the region. The communication “On the Development of Energy Policy for the Enlarged EU, its Neighbours and 
Partner Countries” (European Commission 2003b) conceives energy cooperation in terms of establishing a common 
regulatory framework for an integrated Euro-Mediterranean energy market. Thus, in terms of rules promotion, the content 
of the EU action, directed at energy market integration between the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea, may be 
summarised as follows: the promotion of network unbundling, a regulated TPA regime, the establishment of IRAs, and an 
incentive based tariff system. IRAs are most likely one of the most tangible outcomes of market reforms as concerns the 
utilities industry. The OECD describes these new entities as “one of the most widespread institutions of modern regulatory 
governance” (OECD 2002). The agencies’ autonomy and independence are signs of the credibility of the incumbents’ 
commitment not to undermine the independence of the regulated sector (Trillas and Montoya 2011). Thus, to assure the 
credibility of the liberalisation process, the inception of IRAs is fundamental (Levy and Spiller, 1994; Majone 1996) 
together with a guarantee to avoid the political capture of these authorities. The regulatory agencies were given the 
mandate to regulate the activity of network industries and to discipline the potential conflict of interests between the 
government and the state controlled utilities. The IRAs should operate with their own specialised staff and detailed tasks, 
independently of ministries or government departments. The European Commission, especially, urged member states’ 
governments to establish formally independent regulators in the energy industry, albeit leaving the decision regarding the 
definition and the scope of the delegated powers to the national executives. Typically, the delegated regulatory tasks 
involve price setting decisions at both the retail and the wholesale level – whenever access to essential facilities is needed 
to develop market competition – the definition of entry conditions, the imposition of quality standards and all of the 
technical rules related to the use of or access to existing infrastructures. An assessment of the roles and functions of 
MENA IRAs is therefore pivotal to understanding the degree of diffusion for the EU promoted model of liberalisation, 
with the IRAs’ autonomy and independence being fundamental to effective unbundling, non-discrimination among utility 
companies, and the capability to facilitate the entrance of new, private operators.   
 
4. Perception Survey Method4  
 
To analyse the perception of rules promotion, data have been collected through a survey directed at regulators from 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. The questionnaire investigates the respondents’ perception of the role that both the EU 
and MedReg have played in terms of rules adoption. Some questions are also dedicated to the bottom-up pressure.  
The survey is based on the literature on EU external governance and considers the eventual socialisation mechanisms 
among countries in the same region (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Gilardi 
2005a, b). The survey has been structured following OECD (2012) recommendations on measuring regulatory 
performance through perception surveys. Specifically, we take care to avoid questions that suggest answers and question 
priming, which may happen when a previous question suggests the answer to the subsequent one. The survey has been 
tested by experts in the European University Institute – the Florence School of Regulation, the Oxford Energy Institute, 
and the Italian International Affairs Institute. 
The majority of the questions asked the respondents to express an evaluation of the considered elements on a scale 
from 0 to 5. To place the countries along a continuum between 0 and 1, all questions using the 0 to 5 scale adopt the 
                                                 
4 The survey text is available from the authors upon request 
  
following coding system: 5=1.00; 4=0.75; 3=0.50; 2 and 1=0.25; 0 =0. The reported results do not confirm the tendency 
stressed by the OECD (2012), which states that respondents are shown to have median responses (3) on a scale from 0 to 
5. Thus, this is the first confirmation that the answers that we have obtained are informed ones. 
With reference to the regulatory agencies involved in the study, information is provided in table 2. All of the countries 
involved fulfilled our selection criteria of having established an IRA and having adopted, to a certain extent, sector 
unbundling and a TPA regime.  
Table 3 reports the details of the agency organisation models as they emerged through the analysis of existing 
literature and the agencies’ involvement in managing the aforementioned aspects of the energy sector. The country model 
of unbundling, TPA and tariff setting is briefly reported in table 4; detailed information is only available for the electricity 
sector. A TPA regime has been adopted in Jordan and Turkey. Furthermore, tariff setting, a key regulatory tool on which 
independence and autonomy of regulatory agencies may be assessed, is managed directly by executives in the Algerian 
and Egyptian case and by IRAs only in the Jordanian and Turkish cases. 
The study undertaken is of a qualitative nature. The obtained answers have been provided by respondents who have 
already taken part in training sessions arranged by MedReg. Thus, the respondents were aware of both the networks’ roles 
and competences as well as the EU programs for cooperation. 
Additionally, the data collected have been completed using semi-structured interviews designed according to the 
conceptual background on methods and pressures for rules promotion described in Section 2. The interviews follow the 
same structure as the survey, although the nature of the semi-structured questions allowed the respondents more freedom 
to justify their answers. Table 5 illustrates the number of respondents to the survey and the number of semi-structured 
interviews. The officers of Egyptian (5 respondents, including the Agency Managing Director) and Algerian (5 
respondents) regulatory agencies were interviewed in May 2011 during the Florence School of Regulator and MedReg 
training seminar dedicated to Mediterranean energy regulators.  
It should be stressed that the interviews, as well as survey results, do not permit different answers to emerge from 
within the same organisation. The justification for the missing variation is twofold. First, all respondents were from 
primarily state-controlled organisations; thus, we assume that respondents cannot freely express their own opinion but 
must express the opinion of the agency. Second, for those countries for which interviews are not available, it should be 
stressed that the officers involved were from agencies’ communication offices, which generally report the position and the 
views of the agency instead of the officers’ personal views.  
 
5. Perception Survey Results  
 
5.1 Hierarchy pressure  
To measure the EU’s role as an energy rules promoter, the regulators have been asked to express an evaluation on a 
scale from 0 to 5 of the EU’s top-down pressure compared to the EU’s indirect pressure. The question asked is the 
following: “On a scale from 0 to 5, how do you perceive the EU’s (i.e., the European Commission Directorate for 
Energy, primarily the EU Development Cooperation Office) methods for energy rules promotion?” The options 
provided were also explained as follows:  
- Direct pressure, top-down; 
- Indirect, horizontal, participatory based method;  
- Non-existent.  
The respondents were asked to provide an evaluation with regards to all of the options provided. 
The answers to the first question do not show any variation between how the EU’s direct and indirect pressure are 
perceived by the MENA regulators. All of the respondents gave a score of 4 to both direct and indirect pressure. 
  
In this regards, the survey has a control question, which allows the meaning of direct and indirect pressure applied by 
the EU to be further clarified. The second question of the survey asked if, in the opinion of respondents, “the EU action in 
the energy sector is more effective when acting directly in bilateral relations or when promoting energy rules 
indirectly through regulatory networks, such as MedReg?” All of the respondents expressed a clear preference for the 
“acting directly in bilateral relations” option. Considering that the respondents are governmental actors, it is not surprising 
that they prefer the direct involvement of the EU Directorates.   
The role of the EU’s direct rules promotion has also been investigated in regards to specific issues of energy 
regulation. Specifically, “On a scale from 0 to 5, how would you say that the cooperation with the EU impacts the 
following sectors in terms of rules adoption or rules change?” The question refers to the setting of tariffs, retail market 
competition, sector unbundling, TPA regimes, energy efficiency programs, incentives for renewables, IRA political 
independence, attention to vulnerable customers, and IRA stakeholder independence. Figure 2 shows the differences in the 
MENA regulators’ perception for each issue considered. 
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Figure 1: EU Rle on Rules Adoption 
 
The EU influence is shown to be relevant for those aspects that are closely related to the market (retail, tariff setting) 
as well as to the sector unbundling and TPA. The EU influence on the independence of IRAs, both from political power 
and stakeholders, does not appear to be effective.  
The section on the EU rules promotion method concludes with the two following questions. First, the respondents 
must express “On a scale from 0 to 5 their agreement on the following:  
- Rules for energy sector organisation have been very often based on the EU model;  
- Energy sector organisation has been based on internationally recognised rules and principles (IS);  
- EU energy rules are very often mentioned in the discourse of domestic decision makers;  
- Domestic decision makers tend to conform their behaviour, with regards to the energy sector, with the 
recommendations of the EU”.   
This question is aimed at assessing the degree that the MENA system adheres to the model recommended by the EU, 
illustrating whether the EU regulations are potentially relevant for the domestic system. The answers to this question 
provide a measure of the potential Europeanisation without membership. In this regard, we refer to how Europeanisation 
is considered in the seminal work of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005). The study considers not just formal rules 
adoption but also the behavioural and discursive concept of rules adoption. The former refers to rules-conforming 
behaviour and the latter to the “incorporation of a rule as a positive reference into discourse among domestic actors” 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, p.8).  
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Figure 2: Domestic actors conform to EU energy behaviour 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the establishment of a framework of cooperation helps to expand the EU system of rules and 
even has a positive impact on the behaviour of the domestic actors.  
The EU system clearly proves to be relevant for Egypt. The interviews with Egyptian regulators confirm the intention 
of the policy makers to adopt a system as similar as possible to the EU one.  
Jordan’s survey answers confirm their high appreciation for EU rules and international standards.  
Turkey partially affirms the arguments with regard to the Europeanisation hypothesis and the relevance of the 
membership perspective for the domestic actors’ behaviour. Although the EU system is often quoted in public discourse, 
the domestic system does not entirely mesh with the EU system, and even the behaviour of the domestic actors does not 
conform to the recommendations of the Union. 
Algeria, indeed, not being a part of the APs and not being directly involved in EU bilateral initiatives, exemplifies the 
low relevance of the EU in domestic public discourse as well as to the domestic actors’ behaviour. Indeed, being a major 
energy producer, Algeria most likely has different preferences regarding the energy sector regulatory setting. For instance, 
unbundling may appear to be less conceivable for Algeria’s incumbent operator, Sonatrach. 
Interviews with the officers from the Algerian regulatory agency confirm that the rules for the electricity sector have been 
adopted primarily because of the general consensus on their effectiveness more than because of the EU recommendation. 
The differences among the countries observed in this study, especially when considering specific regulatory aspects, 
confirm the different perceptions of the EU as a rules promoter as well the variation in the countries’ energy interests. 
Such variation determines the differentiation of the acquis to be adopted (Escribano 2010). 
 
5.2 Network pressure 
Considering network-based rules diffusion, we asked the respondents to compare indirect rules promotion, primarily 
through the MedReg network, with the EU’s hierarchical pressure. In addition to MedReg membership, we consider the 
perception of the role that the network may play for the same regulatory aspects investigated in terms of the EU role (see 
Fig. 1). Specifically, we asked “On a scale from 0 to 5, how would you say that the cooperation within MedReg 
impacts the following in terms of rules adoption or rules change?” 
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Figure 3: MedReg Role on Rules Adoption 
 
With the exception of Jordan, the MENA countries do not give high scores to MedReg’s actions, specifically in the 
regulatory sector as well as in the promotion of the IRAs’ independence. On the contrary, these results show the critical 
aspects associated with networks and networking governance.  
To verify whether MedReg is observed as an autonomous network, an additional question investigates the presence of 
the elements for a proper governance network as identified by the literature (see Section 2.2). We asked “On a scale from 
0 to 5, how would you say that the following options characterise members' relations within MedReg?” The options 
provided and explained in the survey text were as follows:  
- A participatory model of decision-making;  
- Codified Procedural Rules (with regards to the definition of meeting agendas; voting systems, etc.);  
- Monitoring and Control Procedures (with regards to principles and rules to be implemented in the energy sector);  
- Resource sharing (sharing primarily expertise and know-how).  
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Figure 4: MedReg as a Network Governance Model 
 
As shown in Figure 4, the answers are, on average, between 2 and 3 for all options, with the exception of the Egyptian 
regulators, who give a value of 4 to the second and third options. 
These data confirm the weaknesses of the network-based initiatives as perceived by our respondents. As proven by 
recent work on EU domestic cases of network governance (Casey and Lawless 2011), the networks are weakened by their 
perceived lack of legitimacy, by the network participants, and by their high structural flexibility, which limits effective 
coordination within the network. Further investigation may reveal whether such a limit also exists for MedReg. 
 
5.3 Between top-down and bottom-up pressure 
  
The perception of the respondents in terms of the other international actors, regional networks and domestic factors 
with regards to energy rules adoption was also investigated. On a scale from 0 to 5, the respondents were asked to compare 
the role of the three types of actors: other international actors, with the exception of the EU bodies previously 
investigated; networks, MedReg included; and domestic actors.  
Figure 5 shows the results with regard to “other international actors”. European Union members have been included 
to measure the extent to which the perception of EU countries differs compared to the perception of the EU as a single 
actor. Moreover, the question also refers to specific European countries that are relevant in terms of Mediterranean politics 
and energy interests (such as Germany for the Desertec initiative and France for the UfM). The reference to specific 
European countries have been included to consider the different perceptions that the respondents may have of country-
specific foreign energy policies compared to the EU one; the latter is often criticised for not being the expression of “one 
single voice”.  
In this regard, only Egypt answered all of the provided options; Algeria replied only to the WTO and IEA, assigning 
them each a score of 1. Turkey gave a 1 to the UN system, a 3 to the WTO, and a 4 to the IEA. Emerging powers, such as 
China, are not perceived as being relevant by our respondents despite recent interest in Northern Africa’s resources. 
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Figure 5: Perception of Other International Actors Roles 
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Figure 6: Regional networks as energy rules promoters 
Note: ECCAWA, Economic Social Committee for Arab Countries in West Asia, UN system. 
AUPTDE, Arab Union for Electricity Producers, Transmitters and Distributors, based in Amman Jordan. 
MEDELEC, Mediterranean Committee for Electricity, grouping together the entire Mediterranean electrical industry. 
OME, Mediterranean Energy Observatory, non-profit research centre grouping together energy industries of the Mediterranean. 
ERRA, Energy Regulators Regional Association, a network of regulatory bodies from the Central European and Eurasian region, 
with affiliates from Africa, Asia, the Middle East and the USA. 
 
  
 
The same question and the same scale of preferences have been used with regard to the regional networks of 
cooperation, focusing on the Mediterranean and the Middle East. As Figure 6 shows, the weight of these networks in the 
respondents’ perception is very low. In reference to our case of network governance, MedReg, low scores were also 
registered, while the other networks appear to perform better (such as ERRA for Turkish respondents).  
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Figure 7: Role of Domestic Actors 
 
Finally, the role of bottom-up pressure has been analysed. Although there were few replies, the bottom-up pressure 
for rules change (Figure 7) emerges as the most relevant in the region, with executive power as the actor pushing for 
effective rules adoption and implementation. The Turkish respondents grant a high level of importance to Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) and also to the energy industry, showing the extent of the difference between the veto players and 
the executive. The higher score given to the Energy Industry by Egypt demonstrates that the industry stakeholders are 
relevant veto players, more so than the executive power. Nonetheless, one should be aware that the MENA energy industry 
is primarily state-owned. Thus, the existing continuity between the industry board of directors and the executive powers is 
the institutional factor that primarily affects the countries’ regulatory framework. These results, jointly with the findings 
provided in Figure 2, reveal the major role played by the domestic institutional environment in the sector’s reform projects 
as well as the IRAs independence both from political power and the energy stakeholders. Furthermore, these results 
confirm the previous results for the EU rules promotion and strengthened the executive powers quoted in Section 2, 2.3. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This study illustrates the findings of a survey addressed to MENA regulators investigating the perception of three 
sources of pressure for rules change: hierarchy, network and bottom-up. Although only based on four countries, the sample 
provides a clear picture from the MENA countries that have established an IRA.  
With regard to our results, when comparing the direct and indirect pressures, the results confirm that the respondents 
perceive the EU direct rules promotion to be more effective. Although the study is limited in the number of regulatory 
agencies involved, our results question the definition of network governance as one of the most promising mode of rules 
diffusion. Indeed, the presence of the elements of proper network governance does not assure that MedReg is perceived as 
being effective in terms of promoting a shared and coordinated regulatory framework in the region.  
The same results are observed when MedReg is compared to other networks. In the respondents’ perception, other 
networks, such as ERRA, are perceived to be more effective. The latter pursues the coordination of a different system of 
rules through training and knowledge exchange; the MedReg primarily develops studies and policy recommendations. The 
  
same objective, thus, is pursued through different methods. How much these differences are perceived by the regulators 
remains to be investigated. 
Eventually, when the third explanatory factor, bottom-up pressure, is included in the analysis, the executives emerge 
as the most important actors for deciding the extent of the adoption of particular regulatory standards. Domestic 
institutions are, as expected, essential for effective and credible regulatory commitments as well as for the independence of 
IRAs. In contexts such as MENA, characterised by long-lasting regimes, the executive in charge is considered to be the 
sole decision maker. Our findings show that decisions on adopting and implementing sectoral reforms suffer vetoes from 
the energy stakeholders’ industries. Moreover, external rules promote, both from the top-down and at the network level, 
risk ineffectiveness when concrete incentives for rules change are missing; in the best case scenario, the result may be a 
pure cosmetic change, such as in the case of the regulatory agencies missing independence.  
European direct pressure generally plays a role at the country level but, as given in the literature, the incentives for 
rule change (i.e., conditionality measures) are rarely implemented. The domestic actors have a key role in rules 
convergence, which is often the result of voluntary approximation to a regulatory model such as that promoted by the EU. 
Considering the relevance of hierarchical pressure, as well as the role of domestic actors, a new approach to energy rules 
promotion should to be adopted. Consistent with previous works on the EU’s role as the energy rules promoter in the 
neighbourhood countries, such as Escribano (2010) and Darbouche (2011), the framework of the EU action needs to be 
defined not at a country-specific, but at an energy corridor/ level. Following this approach, such as in the case of the newly 
established MED-TSO – Association of Mediterranean Transmission System Operators – it is not differences at the 
country level that matter but shared interests at the corridor level. This altered approach may also allow new, and more 
coherent, incentives for rule adoption to emerge. 
  
Tables 
 
Table 1 EU legislative sources: gas and electricity sector 
 
DIRECTIVE 96/92/EC for Electricity 
DIRECTIVE 98/30/EC for Gas 
DIRECTIVE 2003/54/EC for Electricity 
DIRECTIVE 2003/55/EC for Gas 
DIRECTIVE 2009/72/EC for Electricity 
DIRECTIVE 2009/73/EC for Gas 
Generation: principle of non-discrimination; 
Authorisation procedure (art. 4 DIR. 98/30/EC). 
For electricity sector: possibility of tendering 
(art. 4, DIR. 96/92/EC) 
Generation: Tendering procedure for new 
capacity for the electricity sector (art.7 DIR. 
2003/54/EC). Authorisation procedure 
respecting non-discrimination principle, for gas 
(art. 4 DIR. 2003/55/EC) 
Generation: Tendering procedure for the 
electricity sector (art.8 DIR. 2009/72/EC) 
Authorisation procedure respecting non-
discrimination principle, for gas (art. 4 DIR. 
2009/73/EC) 
TSO: Unbundling: of accounts (art.10 DIR. 
96/92/EC) 
TSO: Unbundling: independent, at least in terms 
of its legal form, organisation and decision 
making from other activities (art.10, DIR. 
2003/54/EC; art. 9 DIR. 2003/55/EC) 
 
TSO Unbundling: independent, at least in terms 
of its legal form, organisation and decision 
making from other activities (art.9 DIR. 
2009/72/EC; art.9 DIR. 2009/73/EC) 
DSOs: Unbundling of accounts (art.14 DIR. 
96/92/EC) 
DSOs Unbundling: legal, organisation and 
decision making (art.15 DIR. 2003/54/EC; art.13 
DIR. 2003/55/EC) 
DSOs Unbundling: legal, organisation and 
decision making (art.26 DIR. 2009/72/EC; art.26 
DIR. 2009/73/EC) 
 
TPA regime: regulated, negotiated, single buyer 
(art.15-18 DIR. 96/92/EC; art. 14-16 DIR. 
98/30/EC) 
TPA regime: regulated, based on public tariffs 
(art. 20 DIR. 2003/54/EC; art. 18 DIR. 
2003/55/EC) 
TPA regime: regulated, based on public tariffs  
(art. 32 DIR. 2009/72/EC; art.32 DIR. 
2009/73/EC)   
IRA: non-specified IRA designation (art. 23 DIR. 2003/54/EC; 
art.25 DIR. 2003/55/EC) 
IRA strengthened role and powers (chapter IX 
DIR. 2009/72/EC; chapter VIII DIR. 
2009/73/EC) 
† Note: TSO stands for Transmission System Operator; DSO stands for Distribution System Operator 
  
Table 2 Agency identification 
Country IRA Name IRA Acronym Year Legislative 
source  
Algeria 
 
Electricity and 
Gas Regulatory 
Commission 
CREG 2002 Law No 02-01, 
February 5, 
2002 on 
electricity and 
gas distribution  
 
Algeria Autorité de 
Régulation des 
Hydrocarbures 
ARH NP* NP* 
Egypt Electric Utility 
and Consumer 
Protection 
Regulatory 
Agency 
EGYPTERA 2001 Presidential 
Decree no. 339 
for reorganising 
the authority  
Jordan  Electricity 
Regulatory 
Commission 
ERC 2001 Council of 
Ministers 
decision issued 
on 15 January 
2001 
Turkey  Energy Market 
Regulatory 
Authority 
EMRA 2001 Electricity 
Market Law, 
4628, 2001 
Source: Authors’ survey on the electricity sector of MENA countries and the role of international cooperation; 
agency statutes and laws  
*NOTE - NA: information not available 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 3 Agency organisation and role managing the energy sector 
Country IRA 
Acronym 
IRA 
managerial 
body* (RC; 
SHR) 
IRA under 
incumbents’ 
control 
IRA advisory 
body, 
partially 
independent 
IRA 
COMPETENCES 
**: 
UNBUNDLING 
IRA 
COMPETENCES 
**: 
TPA 
IRA 
COMPETENCES 
**: 
TARIFF 
SETTING 
Algeria 
 
CREG RC - Board of 
four 
commissioners 
X     
Algeria ARH RC - 
Executive 
Committee 
President, and 
5 Directors 
X     
Egypt EGYPTERA RC X     
Jordan  ERC RC X  X  X 
Turkey  EMRA RC  X X  X 
Source: Country Reports from the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Limassol 2007, have been considered for the 
analysis of the IRAs’ competences for energy. Information on their organisation has been requested during interviews conducted 
on May 2011 and, for Jordan and Turkey primarily, in the survey text. 
*NOTE: RC model – Regulatory Council, Chairman plus Council members and Regulatory Staff; SHR model - Single Head 
Regulator, one President plus Regulatory staff. When available, additional information is provided in the table. 
** NOTE: Competences are reported only when indicated as exclusive competences of the agency. Shared competences or issues 
on which the agency has only a consultative role are not provided. 
 
  
Table 4 Electricity sector degree of openness 
Country UNBUNDLING TPA TARIFF SETTING 
Algeria 
 
FUNCTIONAL 
separation 
between 
generation, 
transport and 
distribution in the 
electricity sector 
Introduced in 
2002 
Fixed by the Prime 
Minister 
Egypt FUNCTIONAL 
missing detailed 
information 
NA Defined by the 
Government. 
Jordan  Full ownership 
unbundling 
achieved in 1999 
Regulated 
regime 
NA 
Turkey  Sector unbundled Regulated 
regime 
Approved by IRA 
Source: Country Reports from the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Limassol 2007 
*NOTE - NA: information not available 
 
 
 
  
Table 5 Respondents 
Country IRA Acronym Survey Respondents Interview Respondents 
Algeria 
 
CREG 1 3 
Algeria ARH 3 2 
Egypt EGYPTERA 1 5 
Jordan ERC 1 NA* 
Turkey EMRA 1 NA* 
*NOTE - NA: information not available. These agencies did not take part in MedReg FSR Training on May 2011 when other 
interviews were conducted  
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